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A FAREWELL 
TO ARMS?
The Gulf War put the spotlight on Australia's fledgling 
arms industry. Mike Ticher argues that, short of 
pacifism, Australia can't hope to keep its hands 'clean' of 
the arms trade. What it can do is try to exercise a little
responsibility.
efence Minister Robert Ray's recent an­
nouncement that his department had 
refused clearance for huge weapons 
sales to foreign governments marked a 
new twist in the recent history of Australia's 
policy on arms exports. According to Senator Ray, 
one proposed deal involved the sale of $450 mil­
lion of (unidentified) offensive weaponry to an 
(unnamed) country in an "area of instability*’, and 
that this was "by no means the largest" deal 
rejected by the department.
In other words, the government is prepared to forgo as 
much as $1,000 million worth of exports for the sake of 
maintaining Australia's "strict policy" on overseas arms 
sales. According to a spokesperson for Senator Ray: "What 
we're saying is that we're putting our hands up and saying 
that we've got to look a lot more closely at our role in the 
bigger picture. And if it hurts us and costs us, well that's 
something that we're going to have to bear."
Just how big a hurt this implies can be judged from the fact 
that the $450 million deal alone would have represented 
considerably more than the total value of Australia's arms 
exports for 1989-90. There are those who doubt that this 
apparently highly principled stance has any basis in reality. 
Democrat leader Janet Powell says that "the minister's 
claim has either been fabricated or greatly exaggerated. 
Unless he reveals all the relevant details, the public should 
assume that he has misled them." Certainly the 
government's refusal to name even the country for which 
the equipment was intended makes it impossible to assess 
the way in which the guidelines on arms exports are being 
interpreted, even assuming that the accusation that the 
contracts never existed is groundless.
Nevertheless, the minister's assertion that "there does have 
to be a change of attitude" is a welcome, if slightly confus­
ing, policy shift. The current guidelines on arms exports, 
announced in June 1988 and introduced the following year, 
represent a considerable liberalisation of previous controls. 
They maintain the ban on exports to countries subject to 
UN resolutions embargoing sales (this essentially has 
meant South Africa and, recently, Iraq). They also retain
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restrictions on selling weapons to "governments that 
seriously violate the human rights or constitutional rights 
of their citizens". However, then Defence Minister Kim 
Beazley indicated that sales to such governments would be 
permitted, as long as there was "no reasonable risk of using 
the equipment against the citizens of a country with a 
dubious human rights record".
Other significant alterations were made to the old 
guidelines as part of the government's attempt to boost 
overseas sales of defence equipment. For example, a dis­
tinction was drawn between 'inherently lethal' and 'non- 
lethal' equipment, with only goods that are 'lethal' or 'of 
major military significance' now subject to controls. No 
specific commitment was included not to supply countries
engaged in military conflict, although subsequently the 
department has stated that its "strict policy" does not allow 
sales to "areas of instability". The processing of applica­
tions was speeded up, with a decision now required within 
21 days of submission, with a presumption in favour of 
allowing a sale "where our friends and allies would supply 
comparable equipment”. At the same time, the role of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs in assessing export applica­
tions was drastically reduced, giving Defence the dear 
responsibility for policy and thus weakening foreign 
policy considerations in the derision-making.
The stated purpose of this change in policy (which was 
based on the recommendations of die 1986 Cooksey 
Report) was to reduce the necessity to import equipment
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for Australia's own defence needs, by encouraging the
Kwth of locally-based manufacturers. At the time, Kim zley confidently asserted that exports could rise rapidly 
from $200 million a year, to around $500 million. The 
Sydney Morning Herald commented that "the [Cooksey] 
report confirmed what was already understood in defence 
circles-that Australia was losing many opportunities for 
defence equipment sales because of the extremely cumber­
some bureaucratic constraints on such sales" (SMH 
15/6/88).
Unfortunately for fortunately, depending on your point of 
view), the expected bonanza did not take place. Robert Ray 
claims that Australia's defence supplies are now 70% local­
ly-manufactured, compared to 20-30% under the old 
guidelines. Yet despite vague sums of "around $300 mil­
lion" being mentioned by Ray, the government's own 
figures show that the real figure for applications approved 
(not contracts completed) in 1989-90 was just $157 million. 
The figure for actual sales may be around $115 million 
(Weekend Australian 9/3/91) or even lower, according to 
analaysts such as Dr Graeme Cheese man of the Peace 
Research Centre at ANU. He claims that the government 
"embarked on this whole program, as far as we can deter­
mine, without doing any studies on the economic 
feasibility, or taking in the potential political costs of arms 
exporting. The Cooksey Report...promised pots of gold, but 
all the problems are well-known from other countries' 
experience."
But while the government may have failed dismally in its 
aim of substantially increasing arms sales, the new policy 
nevertheless led to some extremely dubious transactions. 
The most notable of these was the sale of 50 Mirage fighters 
to Pakistan in 1990, which raised two important issues. 
One, that had foreign policy considerations been given 
more weight, the almost derisory sum of money involved 
($36 million) would surely not have been enough to win 
the argument in favour of the sale. The other was the 
Defence Department's interpretation of the concepts of 
'major military significance' and 'regions of instability'.
Robert Ray denied that the sale breached either of these 
conditions at a press conference on 1 February this year 
The degree of offensiveness of those weapons, I suppose, 
would be very much in question with the Indians, but the 
reason why we no longer wanted them is that we don't 
regard them as particularly effective weapons. The Pakis­
tanis ha ve a different view on tha t, but most of the decisions 
and agreements were made long before the tensions be­
tween India and Pakistan had built." Lest it be assumed that 
Senator Ray meant that the sale was decided upon some 
time in the 1930s, his spokesperson added: "at the time we 
sold those weapons systems, there were extremely good 
relations between India and Pakistan—it really did look as 
though those problems had been resolved, but unfor­
tunately the situation completely turned around". (Pakis­
tan and India threatened war over the Indian state of 
Kashmir.)
This begs the question of what exactly is a 'region of 
instability' if not the Indian sub-continent, and what exact­
ly are 'lethal' weapons, if not fighter aircraft (albeit old
ones)? The same points could be made over the proposed 
sale of spares for PC9 trainer aircraft to Iraq, which was 
only halted after the UN embargo was imposed following 
the invasion of Kuwait. Clearly, such aircraft have no com­
bat role to play in the war, but equally dearly the Iraqis felt 
that they were useful for training pilots who would even­
tually fly something a little more dangerous. It seems par­
ticularly obtuse to deny that any military assistance to a 
regime like Saddam Hussein's does not have the potential 
to be 'lethal'. It also reflects the same idiosyncratic inter­
pretation of 'regions of instability' as Kim Beazley's com­
ment on a defence equipment exhibition in Cairo in 1987, 
which he said “will provide an excellent opportunity for 
Australian companies to assess the market potential for 
their products in the Middle East”.
Australia's own arms bazaar, AID EX '91, is due to be held 
in Canberra in November. It has expanded considerably 
since the last exhibition in 1989 and this year the organisers 
proudly note that "particularly targetted will be govern­
ment defence and industry leaders from countries in the 
Asia-Pacific region". As described in the Independent Month­
ly (October 1990), Asia i s one of the few regions of the world 
where defence expenditure is rising sharply (before the 
Gulf War, of course), and Australia has supplied equipment 
to many countries in the region. Sales are not vast, as most 
transfers are part of government aid under the Defence 
Co-Operation Program .Nevertheless, approvals for sales 
to the Philippines ($3-3m), Indonesia ($1.0m) and Thailand 
($0.75m) were given in 1989-90, as well as for smaller deals 
with Singapore and Myanmar (Burma). If Robert Ray is 
seriously concerned about the dangers of regional arms 
races, and Australia's potential contribution to preventing 
them, he needs to look no further than our own backyard. 
Nor are the DCP deals without controversy, as the use of 
Australian helicopters in the Bougainville conflict showed,
A third deal which should have raised more eyebrows than 
it did was the proposed sale of Strikemaster trainer aircraft 
to Somalia in 1989-90, which was approved by the depart­
ment but subsequently fell through for commercial 
reasons. The ethics of supplying military equipment worth 
nearly $5 million to a country with such obvious needs in 
other areas are surely questionable (Australia also sold $2 
million worth of equipment to Bangladesh in the same 
year). Quite apart from this, and the notorious 'stability' of 
the Horn of Africa, the (former) Somali government's 
record on human rights was shameful, a point made by 
Democrat Senator Paul McLean in a questi on to Robert Ray 
earlier this year. Ray replied that the "distinction [between 
lethal and non-lethal weapons! is quite a clear one in terms 
of our export policy. I do not say that it is based strictly on 
morality.”
Morality aside, it is nonsense to suggest that the distinction 
is a clear one, or one which facilitates a consistent policy. 
The minister himself admits that "these are not easy distinc­
tions to make", but nevertheless maintains their resolution 
ensures that "we are avoiding selling lethal weapons...into 
areas of instability". But the sheer vagueness of the ter­
minology means that gross anomalies are bound to occur. 
For example, no controls whatever are applied to sales to 
our third largest customer, the UK (along with the US, New
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What e xa ctly  are ’lethal’ 
weapons, if not fighter 
aircraft?
i
Zealand and Canada they are specifically exempted). Yet 
who could seriously argue that Northern Ireland does not 
constitute an area of instability? The inability to predict 
political developments overseas is another obvious hazard. 
Australia's arms transfers to Fiji, for example, were halted 
after the coups of 1987 but, of course, that didn't prevent 
equipment supplied previously from being used by the 
military. In this case the quantities and type of materiel 
were insignificant, but it shows the problems inherent in 
supplying goods even to apparently 'stable' countries. The 
same applies to the recent coup in Thailand.
And then, of course, the question of morality does arise, 
whatever the minister might say. Unless we take a com­
pletely pacifist stance, an arms industry in Australia will 
continue to exist, and a certain amount of exports will help 
to offset the cost of imports for our own military. It can 
hardly be argued that importing weapons is somehow 
morally superior to exporting them. The important thing is 
to be clear about the function of an export industry and the 
restrictions that should be applied to it. At the moment, the 
government seems caught between the Beazley doctrine of 
positively encouraging sales within guidelines which 
make a mockery of most people's understanding of the 
English language, and Ray's apparent concern to see 
Australia take a lead in curbing sales worldwide.
Australia is by no means in the big league of arms dealers, 
and compared to countries such as the Soviet Union, France 
and the UK, does have more or less 'clean hands': although, 
it might be added, not for want of trying in the last couple 
of years. The fact that the expansion of the industry has
largely been a failure does not mean that we can afford to 
be complacent about Australia's moral standpoint. A 
return to stricter guidelines would give Australia a firmer 
moral base from which to argue for a reduction in the global 
arms trade.
These should ensure that Australia is not only not supply­
ing weaponry for use in dubious circumstances, but is also 
seen to be sensitive to the issue. Sweden, a country with a 
proportionately large arms industry, but whose export 
policy the Defence Department quotes approvingly as a 
model for Australia, takes a distinctly different line from 
Kim Beazley on exports to countries with dubious human 
rights records. Its government accepts that "consideration 
of human rights involves a detailed assessment of the 
situation in a country, and not merely of whether Swedish 
military equipment is likely to be used to suppress these 
rights".
Australia should also rely on its own judgment about what 
is or is not acceptable, rather than favouring sales where 
"our friends and allies" would supply comparable equip­
ment. Some of our friends and allies-Franoe for example- 
-seem perfectly happy to supply huge quantities of 
weapons to almost anyone who can pay for them. A more 
sensitive attitude in general would be engendered by 
toning down expectations of the volume of business 
Australia should expect to do in a contracting international 
arms market and by re-integrating the Department of 
Foreign Affairs into the decision-making process. Gareth 
Evans admitted on Channel Nine's Sunday program in 
February that he was unaware of both the Iraqi and Somali 
deals until after the decisions had been taken, and criticised 
the present guidelines for "not being sufficiently explicit 
about the kinds of foreign policy considerations that 
should be taken into account".
If the horrors of the Gulf War have convinced Robert Ray 
that the political problems involved in upping arms ex­
ports may not be worth the revenue (even $1,000 million of 
it), then some good at least would have come of i t  But it 
seems optimistic to hope that his recent pronouncements 
signal a genuine change of heart and a re-evaluation of 
Australia's priorities in this area.
Last June he described AIDEX as "an appropriate forum for 
manufacturers to promote their products and services to 
both local and international visitors", adding that he 
"would anticipate that AIDEX 91...will promote awareness 
of our defence industry potential". Ray now says that "the 
grea t lesson that everyone has learned out of the Gulf is that 
we must control the international arms trade". However, 
action to match his bold words, such as withdrawing 
government participation in AIDEX, seems to be unequivo­
cally off the agenda.
For all the talk of cancelled contracts, Australia does not 
seem likely to deviate from the worldwide pattern of 
response to the devastation caused in the war—a brief 
period of public hand-wringing over arms sales, immedi­
ately followed by a return to 'business as usual'.
MIKE TICHER is a member of ALR's editorial collective.
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